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In two comprehensive studies published by the Brookings Institution, the historical record of US and Soviet
uses of armed forces as political instruments short of war-fighting has been documented. The two studies,
although not strictly comparable, provide very valuable sources of similar events, the study on the USA also
using an interesting technique for deciding the outcomes. The general overview is complemented with
detailed studies of particular cases, as well as a focus on some situations where nuclear threats were used.
The studies suggest that a more limited American use of force would be advantageous and find that the
Soviet Union uses force in a cautious manner. They do not, however, question the wisdom of weapons use,
and do not systematically address questions of conflict escalation or conflict resolution. However, as a
whole, the studies are a most important contribution to peace research.
During the post-1945 period the United States
used its armed forces for specific political
purposes 215 times. In a somewhat longer
period, the Soviet Union used its forces for
comparable purposes in 190 instances. This is
the historical record described in two recent
publications from the Washington-based
Brookings Institution. In the study Force
without War. USA rmed Forces as Political
Instruments (1978), Barry M. Blechman and
Stephen S. Kaplan describe and evaluate US
involvements from January 1, 1945 to De-
cember 31, 1975 with the help of statistical
overviews and diplomatic case studies. In
Diplomacy o,i‘Power. Soviet Armed Forces as
Political Instruments (1981), Stephen S. Kap-
lan compiles some overviews and presents
eight different case studies of corresponding
Soviet engagements from June 1944 to Au-
gust 1979. Both volumes use as their point of
departure an ambition to combine modern so-
cial science methods and historical accounts
in order to provide some insight into the non-
war uses of armed forces. The historical re-
cord arrived at illustrates one of the main
points: armed forces exist not only to wage
war but also to exert pressure, demonstrate
commitment, and ’project power’. Indeed,
given the few war involvements of American
and Soviet troops during the post-1945
period, ’political’ uses seem more frequent
than actual warfighting.
Although one of the authors has contribut-
ed to both volumes, each volume is distinctly
different in method and analysis. The Blech-
man/Kaplan book embarks on an ambitious
attempt to analyse the utility of the use of
force. Thus, in a detailed study using a sample
of the 215 incidents, an attempt is made to
reach general conclusions on the usefulness of
the US uses of armed forces. Some of the
conclusions are quite striking, notably the
finding that the overall strategic balance be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States
bears no systematic relations to the outcome
of the US use of armed force. Thus, un-
favorable and favorable outcomes (from the
US point of view) are recorded in periods of
nuclear superiority as well as under nuclear
parity, also for incidents where the Soviet
Union was a major participant. This clearly
suggests that the ’strength’ searched for in
nuclear weapons does not very easily translate
into policital utility in locally confined con-
flicts. No similar utility analysis is attempted
for the Soviet uses of armed forces. Instead,
the Soviet record is assessed in terms of its im-
plications for American strategy.
Thus, both books are of policy relevance;
the Blechman/Kaplan book in particular
addresses the implicit question of excessive
use of American force, whereas the Kaplan
volume addresses the question of unpredic-
table Soviet use of force. By and large the
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conclusions seem to be, first, that the record
of American successful uses of armed forces
is not impressive either in a short-term or in a
long-term perspective, but that some use of
force is sometimes necessary. Secondly, the
Soviet Union is found to act in a ’prudent’
and ’cautious’ manner when assisting allies
outside of Eastern Europe, even while they
are in direct confrontation with the United
States. The pattern for Eastern Europe is dif-
ferent, however, the readiness for military in-
tervention being higher.
Some of these conclusions appear trivial
and guarded, but are, nevertheless, not with-
out general interest. It should be made clear,
however, that the volumes are parallel rather
than comparative: there is no attempt to
equate American or Soviet behavior. On the
contrary, American intentions are described
in quite operative terms, such as ’compel’ and
’reinforce’ while Soviet intentions are seen in
more ominous light, such as ’expansions and
defense of communism’ and ’security of the
Revolution’. This might not only reflect the
lack of access to more detailed information
on Soviet policy options, but also relate to an
unwillingness to subscribe to a theory of gene-
ral ’Big Power’ behavior. Undoubtedly, the
authors recognize a conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union of an
ideological more than of a realpolitik charac-
ter. The information supplied lends itself,
however, to analyses also on other grounds,
which makes the data collection useful to the
entire research community. Certainly, studies
of similar types on medium-sized or small sta-
tes would be useful continuations, notably
China, France, Israel or Libya.
The data
The Brookings reports aim at describing a
historical record of uses of armed forces as
political instruments. Inevitably, this leads to
a whole set of border line decisions. The re-
ports contain incidents where there is proof of
(a) a deliberate attempt to influence (b) speci-
fic behaviour (c) of other states (d) without
engaging in a continuing contest of violence.
Thus, military threats are not counted unless
they are combined with some military action,
and military action which bears no relation to
an attempt to influence is excluded. Further-
more, wars are not counted. This means that
the studies try to record a middle level of uses
of armed forces: the potential, latent impact
of presence of armed forces in other countries
is not recorded systematically (the presence of
Soviet troops in Eastern Europe is not ac-
counted for, unless it can be linked to some
very specific political situation). Also, the ac-
tual physical imposition of will through war is
excluded (the US war engagements in Korea
and Vietnam are not dealt with). Of course
these distinctions exclude some highly per-
tinent questions from the analysis and color
some of the conclusions. For instance, Blech-
man/Kaplan find a decline in American uses
of force as a political instrument since 1965,
although this very period exhibits the most
heavy use of American force in an attempt to
influence policies in another state (Vietnam).
The rationale behind the exclusion can be ac-
cepted, but then some of the conclusions have
to be qualified.
In a strictly comparative study, the criteria
for excluding the Vietnam and Korea wars
would also lead to the exclusion of Soviet in-
terventions in Berlin, Hungary, and Czecho-
slovakia, as these are examples of the physical
imposition of power. Kaplan argues that in
none of these cases was the Soviet intention to
fight a prolonged war, and thus the examples
should be included. However, similar hopes
might also have been in the minds of Ameri-
can decision-makers in 1965.
Some of these deficiencies are handled by
the use of case studies, which means that the
Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe is ap-
propriately included. Also, the Soviet behavi-
or is charted by starting the study as early as
June 1944 (compared to January 1946 for the
American study) which means that many of
the events in the last two Second World War
years are accounted for. The result is, how-
ever, that the total figures are not strictly
comparable.’ I
The incidents included are not presented in
detail in the volumes, although a great many
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of them are commented on in the text. Still,
one could question the inclusion of some
(notably a Swedish-Soviet incident in August
1967) and the exclusion of others (notably the
Soviet note to Finland in 1961) in the Kaplan
book and similarly in the other volume. Cer-
tainly, there is the problem of what a discrete
incident is compared to a series of develop-
ments. Thus, the decision not to rely exclu-
sively on statistical analysis but also to include
historical-diplomatic narratives seems a wise
one. It makes it possible for the reader to
judge for himself the context in which the in-
cidents take place.
Conclusions on the United States
Blechman/Kaplan find that the United States
uses the navy to a particularly high degree for
political influence attempts. This is a plausible
conclusion (as Korea and Vietnam are not in-
cluded), and perhaps not surprising: it stems
from the US geographical location, being sur-
rounded by oceans. More interesting is the
proposition that such naval demonstrations
tend not to be as ’successful’ as other uses of
force (success from a US perspective, of
course). The authors argue that although na-
val forces may appear powerful, they do not
symbolize commitment to the same extent as
ground troops: ships can be moved in quickly,
but equally quickly they can be withdrawn.
Certainly, this conclusion has a policy impli-
cation, for instance, in seeing the significance
of a renewed naval build-up (as now initiated
in the United States). In a way, however, it
lends some implicit support to the creation of
a rapidly deployable ground force.
The authors also find that smaller forces or
really significant ones (i.e. nuclear forces)
have a higher association with outcomes
favored by American policy makers. Particu-
larly, the use of large forces (conventional
and strategic nuclear) is singled out. Fifteen
such incidents are located and in twelve the
Soviet Union was an actor. In ten of the lat-
ter, the short-term outcome was positive for
the United States, the authors assert. The inci-
dents are all well-known to analysts, notably
the repeated crises over Berlin, Cuba, and the
Middle East. The suggested favorable out-
come for the United States in most of these
events, of course, depends on an evaluation
of what the American as well as the Soviet
ambitions were. Although this might not be
the intention of the authors, their conclusions
lend support to those who demand ’tough’
talk with the Russians. However, the authors
caution the reader by suggesting that the very
restricted use of nuclear weapons is related to
the outcome: as they are so rarely used and
are so dangerous, they clearly signal Ameri-
can commitment. In other words: only by
very infrequently threatening the use of nuc-
lear force does such force serve as a deterrent.
The underlying theme is that the nuclear for-
ces are useful as political instruments, and
that the real problem is their application, not
their existence. Still, the authors do not find
that a general atmosphere of confrontation
against the Soviet Union is in America’s inter-
est. On the contrary, the use of force achieves
more favorable results for the US in periods
of detente than in periods of tension.
The case studies in general take a more cir-
cumscribed view of the political uses of Ame-
rican armed forces. In a comparative study of
the Laos 1962 and the Bengal 1971 crises,
David K. Hall suggests that the application
was successful in the first instance, but not in
the latter. In general, the author warns
against the utility of armed forces as big pow-
ers seldom have the control over their own al-
lies as they (or their opponent) believe them-
selves to have: there is a serious risk of being
drawn into undersirable situations. Similarly,
Jerome N. Slater finds that the US interven-
tion in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was
not the wisest of US policy alternatives. In his
studies of the Lebanon and Jordan crises of
1958 and 1970 respectively, William B.
Quandt concludes that the outcome in the
first one was successful due to a ’large ele-
ment of chance’, and in the second situation
the outcome kept the American decision-
makers in a ’perceptual trap’ which in turn
stimulated the Middle East war in 1973.
The case studies on European events sug-
gest a somewhat more positive appreciation
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of American armed behavior. Robert M.
Slusser, in comparing the Berlin crises of
1958-59 and 1961, finds the Kennedy use of
military instruments a ’remarkable success’,
but is more critical of Eisenhower’s non-
violent way of handling the previous crisis.
This conclusion is somewhat surprising in
view of the fact that the 1958-59 crisis main-
tained the status quo in Berlin, whereas the
1961 one resulted in the construction of the
Wall, changing an important part of the origi-
nal Berlin arrangement.
In a study of Soviet military pressure on
Yugoslavia in the early 1950’s and on Yugo-
slavia and Rumania in 1968, Philip Windsor
suggests that the USA ’succeeded in averting
threats and containing crises’ with its public
statements and supporting military activity.
Windsor also illustrates some of the perplexi-
ties that the break between the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia caused for the Western
audience, being accustomed to a monolithic
view of the ’Soviet bloc’.
The most troublesome problem in all these
studies is the question of ’success’. It appears
sometimes that the deployment of force more
grows out of a consideration ’to do some-
thing’ than of what is the appropriate way to
support a diplomatic message or a political
proposal. Furthermore, the time dimension is
difficult to handle in a systematic manner. Is
it really correct to see three years as a long-
term period, no matter what the magnitude of
the threat?
Conclusions on the Soviet Union
Longer long-term considerations are in the
forefront in the Kaplan book on the Soviet
uses of armed forces. The nuclear threat
exerted by the Soviet Union in 1969 against
China is an example of an action that in the
short-term brought about negotiations on the
border issue and lowered tension, probably as
desired by the Soviet Union. In the long-run,
however, it strengthened China’s interest in
opening up to the West. Thomas W. Robin-
son refers to the ’hint’ of such a nuclear
threat, whereas Kaplan himself leaves no
doubt about the threat and its immediate im-
pact : ’In the one instance when the USSR
raised the spectre of nuclear war, China
quickly compromised’. Kaplan, however,
notes that the Soviet Union ’went beyond
what was required’ and that this threat drove
China closer to the West and alarmed NATO
and Japan as well. Robinson gives little infor-
mation on this incident, beyond a reference to
the journalist Victor Louis. It is not included
in the list of the 190 incidents given in the
book. Still, the nuclear option appears to
have been developed by the Soviet Union du-
ring 1969, and it thus achieves an appropriate
place in the Kaplan volume.
At the other end of the spectrum, Michel
Tatu’s analysis of Soviet interventions in
Eastern Europe is illuminating. Tatu finds
that the latent pressure existing from the pre-
sence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe
might keep internal Communist Party con-
flicts at a low level. The overt uses of force in
the forms of, inter alia, maneuvers are less ef-
fective or even counter-productive in bringing
a local leadership in line with Soviet wishes.
The overwhelming military superiority, one
might conclude, does not inject fear, but
rather appears as ’overkill’ making it ineffec-
tive as a threat. Thus, Soviet physical imposi-
tion of power becomes a possibility. But not
always so. Additional insights might have
been gained from a closer scrutiny of cases
where local Communist leaders actually have
been able to maintain control for themselves
and autonomy for their countries in spite of
Soviet pressure (Yugoslavia, Rumania, and
Albania).
The other essays in Kaplan’s book deal
with the relative reluctance of the Soviet
Union to commit Soviet soldiers to the de-
fence of allied countries. The cases most cle-
arly in mind are the Korean and Vietnam
wars. William Zimmerman notes that ’force is
most effectively applied when it is not actually
used’, in line with the above reasoning.
Koreans and Vietnamese, being able to handle
the situation much on their own, would con-
sequently need no Soviet troops (they might
not have wanted any either?) and the delive-
ries of Soviet materiel would have satisfied all
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parties. Zimmerman notes, however, that the
Soviet Union did nothing elsewhere to weaken
the American interventions.
Still, Zimmermann concludes that in parti-
cular the Soviet policy in the Vietnam war
’probably reassured the Soviet elite about the
wisdom of its course ... (and) reinforced the
Soviet Union’s belief that it could engage pro-
fitably in other low-risk efforts’ without jeo-
pardizing relations with the United States.
This contrasts with the conclusions drawn by
Paul Jabber and Roman Kolkowicz on Soviet
’lessons’ from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel
wars: ’retaining influence over client states ...
may require a commitment to military inter-
vention on the client’s behalf when necessary,
even at the risk of nuclear confrontation’.
The lack of vigorous support for the Arab
countries after the 1967 war had a more last-
ing impact than the intensive arm shipments
during the October war, they conclude. Thus,
these case studies do not help us (or the
Soviets!) to understand the Soviet Union. Un-
certainty about Soviet preferences in general
(low-risk or high-risk policy?) is central to the
prevailing image of Soviet unpredictability.
Still, this is the very image that Kaplan
wants to dispell. In his conclusion, he sug-
gests that Soviet military operations usually
have been ’expected and plausible’, not un-
predictable or part of a threatening, unex-
plainable expansionist drive. Only in very few
instances can the Soviet Union be expected to
use serious coercive military means, Kaplan
states, and then proceeds to formulate a pos-
sible American strategy to this. Its important
elements are to appear strong, motivated and
powerful, as the Soviet Union is sensitive to
US uncertainty. Somewhat in contradiction to
the first volume, Kaplan illustrates such U.S.
behavior with big naval shows of force: at
least two aircraft carrier task groups can
sometimes be an appropriate response to So-
viet deployments.
Although Kaplan’s analysis appears some-
what confined and monotonous in its focus
on variables such as ’confidence’, ’moves’,
’appearance’ and with actors referred to as
’Moscow’ or ’Kremlin’, it nevertheless is use-
ful. The attempt to find a rationale behind
Soviet behavior, to see it as predictable and
cautious, runs counter to prevailing non-aca-
demic analysis of the Soviet Union. Particu-
larly useful is the distinction between Soviet
behavior in Eastern Europe and Northern
Asia versus its activities elsewhere in the Third
World. Unfortunately, however, Kaplan does
not comment at all on the invasion in Afgha-
nistan. It would, of course, not qualify under
the criteria used for inclusion, unless one as-
sumes that the Soviet leadership expected this
to be a speedy operation similar to the ones in
Eastern Europe. But even so, it does not fit
the general pattern suggested by Kaplan
which is that once the Soviet Union employs
ground forces it uses a lot of them: in Afgha-
nistan the highest number of Soviet troops
mentioned is 100,000 men, compared to the
400-500,000 men used in Czechoslovakia.
Furthermore the operation takes place in a re-
gion which cannot be regarded as important
for Soviet security, particularly not after the
fall of the US-supported Shah. Thus, the So-
viet action might in this case be neither ’ex-
pected’ nor ’plausible’.
Conclusion on the Brookings reports
The two volumes provide an extensive review
of the uses of armed forces for specific con-
crete political purposes. As such, they consti-
tute a useful addition to the listings of wars,
civil wars, military confrontations, and armed
conflicts already available to the peace re-
search community. As is always the case with
such listings, some of the inclusions and ex-
clusions can be debated. The importance of
some decisions can be marginal for the analy-
sis, but in this case, the exclusion of the
Korean, Vietnam, and Afghanistan wars has
important implications. The case study ap-
proach might thus have been extended to in-
clude these situations as well, rather than to
neglect them entirely.
The attempt to analyse ’favorable’ out-
comes is quite original and of significance for
continued research. The method used in the
Blechman/Kaplan volume meets reasonable
criteria. The method employed in the Kaplan
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book to systematically compare Soviet beha-
vior is one of counter-factuality: what did the
Soviet Union not do (in order to appreciate
the degree of caution used), when did it do
what it did (in order to evaluate the degree of
provocation involved). This is handy, but
problematic, as disagreements easily arise on
which policy options actually were available
in these situations.
The major deficiency in these studies is,
however, the lack of discussion on the impli-
cations of armed uses on conflict escalation,
emergence of new conflicts, and the possibili-
ty to create lasting peaceful settlements. Kap-
lan concludes that the United States has to
respond to Soviet ’moves’ and that this will
present the Third World with an option: a
choice between maintaining regional autono-
my or inviting American-Soviet rivalry. Given
such a US policy, this might simultaneously
stimulate independence from the Soviet
Union and restrain Soviet behavior, he
claims. However, the two volumes make little
effort to look into the historical record of
such local effects of the big power uses of
armed forces. They merely note the general
hesitancy of both big powers to use force
when the other one is engaged in actual com-
bat. The interaction effects on the local level
would, however, be possible to study in a
combined volume, using the data supplied by
both books. This, furthermore, might lay
some groundwork for an analysis of escala-
tion of armed behavior, and to the problem
referred to in some case studies, namely the
possibility that the big powers may be trapped
by their own perceptions and by the actions of
their own allies. In a time when both powers
refrain from using their own troops in distant
conflicts, and prefer to operate through inter-
mediaries, the significance of such allies might
be increasing. The Nixon doctrine certainly
has its Soviet equivalent as demonstrated both
by Vietnam and Cuba. As allies are not com-
pletely controllable, the superpowers may in
the near future face some dramatic surprises.
The Brookings reports may have prepared us
for some of them, but would have gained
from a heavier emphasis on the independence
of many of the Third World states.
NOTE
1. Strict numerical comparability can be achieved by
counting incidents from Jan 1, 1946 to Dec 31, 1975
which gives a total of 215 incidents for the United States
and 156 for the Soviet Union. However, this means that
the establishment of Soviet control in East Europe is al-
most completely neglected. Exact comparability, in other
words, might not be desirable, when the realities are not
strictly comparable in themselves.
